2. The following documents show the progress of the negotiations and the attitude of the Japanese Navy and Army, and especially of War Minister ITAGAKI, in regard to them. a. Regarding the Five Ministers Conference of 8 August 1938 mentioned in YAMAWAKI’s and KAGESSA’s affidavits, see Exhibit 497, p. 6055, and interrogation of OSHIMA. OSHIMA received a telegram from the General Staff in August 1938 stating that they were more or less in accord (with the German proposals) and that the Five Ministers Conference, which included ITAGAKI, was also agreeable to the German suggestions. b. Exhibit 502, p. 6098, is a telegram from Ribbentrop to Ott dated 26 April 1939 giving an account of the negotiations up to that time. It shows that the Japanese Army wished to conclude a general alliance in the summer of 1938 and that at that time no limitations were suggested. c. Exhibit 780, p. 7909, is a telegram from Ott to the German State Secretary and states that the Five Minister Conference had decided to negotiate with Germany for ht purpose of concluding a military treaty directed against Russia, that parts of the Army advocated a further military treaty also against third powers, and that the Navy recommended limitation on Russia. d. Exhibit 502 (see above) states further that the Japanese draft at the beginning of April 1939 agreed fundamentally with the German proposal but provided for a Japanese declaration after signing of the pact to the effect that England, France and the United States are not the object of the pact. The reason given for the Japanese desire for such a declaration was that “Japan for political and, in particular, for economic reasons was at the moment not yet in a position to come forward openly as the opposer of the three democracies” (p. 6101). e. IPS Document 4035, Item 2, is a telegram from Ott to Ribbentrop dated 27 April 1939 and shows that a Japanese agreement to conclude a military pact with Germany and Italy without shows that the alliance was not a defensive alliance by stating that the Japanese Government combines this consent with the desire that the outbreak of a war be delayed as much as possible because Japan was not at present able to render active support for military and economic reasons. This document is not in evidence. -2-