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Parent | Examination of Documents Results November 13, 1947 |
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Date | 19 November 1947 |
Language | English |
Collection | Tavenner Papers & IMTFE Official Records |
Box | Box 6 |
Folder | General Reports and Memoranda from November 1947 |
Repository | University of Virginia Law Library |
Memo to Mr. Tavenner (Cont'd) Page 4 13 November 1947
4.IPS Document No. 4061 (serial 223, page 2).
A - Item 3 was introduced in evidence as Exhibit 586 (page 6,560) and read in full.
B - Item 5 is identical with IPS Document 4055, Item 3 (see paragraph 2 of this memo).
C - Item 7 was introduced in evidence as Exhibit 1086 (page 9,986) and read in full.
5.IPS Document No. 4065 (serial 220, page 2 and 5). This file of German photostats has been introduced in its entirety for identification as Exhibit 645. Item 11 has not been used in evidence. It is a memo to Ribbentrop from Gaus dated 11 October 1941. Gaus reported a) about a conversation with the Japanese Ambassador to Vichy France KATO regarding German plans against England from which it became clear that KATO was afraid of the possibility of a compromise peace between Great Britain and Germany and b), about a conference with OSHIMA on the question of prolongation of the Anti-Comintern Pact. He (OSHIMA) had wired to Tokyo repeatedly in this matter but had received no instructions. He is most definitely in favor of such a prolongation which should be played up in a great manner.
The secret protocol could be left out since it is now replaced by the Tripartite Pact, Germany and Japan would then have two pacts which complement each other, namely, the Tripartite Pact regulating the political relations between Germany, Japan and Italy and the Anti-Comintern Pact forming the idealogical basis of the close relationship between the three countries.
6.IPS Document No. 4066 (serial No. 219, page 3 and 4). A - Item 9 is a memo to Weizacker from Erdmansdorff dated 18 October 1941 and states: "Ambassdor OSHIMA estimates the Cabinet <insert>change as an</insert>Improvement in the direction of the Axis policy. He believes that the Japanese-American negotiations will not be continued. On the other hand, he deems an immediate Impending entry of Japan into the war not probable. He does
not hold the new Foreign Minister TOGO capable of much initiative. OSHIMA told me that the new Prime Minister TOJO is his / one word illegible/ comrade."
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