|Parent||Collaboration between Japan, Germany and Italy Vol. VII|
|Collection||Tavenner Papers & IMTFE Official Records|
|Folder||Japan, Germany, Italy Collaboration Vol 7|
|Repository||University of Virginia Law Library|
of sufficient forces, in view of American weakness, a hesitant attitude would be initially possible and suitable, in order to drive the U. 8. to a decision, difficult from the domestic political standpoint, on entry into the war. I farther pointed to the necessity of stopping American supplies to Vladivostok, which appeared to be obvious to OKAHOTO. "OKAMOTO expressed his thanks for my statements, and declared he hoped to be able to inform me soon of the result of further deliberations of the army. He requested me to treat the conversation confidentially and in the first place to confine /it/ to army /Wehrmacht/ channels. "I got the impression from the conversation that dis-cussions within the army /Wehrmacht/ had become much more concrete, but that a decision on the question of an advance in the South had not yet been reached. OTT (3) On 28 November 1941 VON RIBBENTROP advised a Japanese representative that it was essential that Japan effect the New Order in East Asia without losing the existing opportunity. "There never has been and probably never will be," he said, "a time when closer cooperation under the Tripartite Pact is so important. If Japan hesitates at this time, and Germany goes ahead and establishes her European New Order, all the military might of Britain and the United States will be concentrated against Japan." He further states: "Should Japan become engaged in a war against the United States, Germany, of course, would join the war immediately. There is absolutely no possibility of Germany's entering into a separate peace with the United States under such circumstances. The Fuehrer is determined on that point."