Page 2 Mr. Hanson W. Baldwin 2)Preparing Japanese Opinion for War, which includes such subjects as education, political organizations, assassinations and threats, and police coercion; 3)Military Aggression in Manchuria; 4)Military Aggression in China; 5)Atrocities in China and Narcotics in China, with special reference to a pattern or plan by which atrocities and the use of narcotics operated to break the will of the people to resist; 6)Economic Aggression in Manchuria and China; 7)Japanese-German-Italian Collaboration; 8)Aggression Against French Indo-China and Thailand; 9)Relations with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic; 10)Preparation for War (December 7, 1941), with special reference to naval, military, fortifications, economic and financial preparations; 11)Relations with the United States and British Commonwealth of Nations. (This is the Pearl Harbor phase proper and is being presented in evidence at this time.); 12)Aggression Against the Netherlands and East Indies; 13)Class “C” Offenses, other than in China; 14)Class “B” Offenses. Laying aside for the present the question of initiating, planning, and waging of wars of aggression in violation of international law and treaty obligations, I do not see how an adequate study can be made of the Japanese plans for precipitating the war culminating in the attack on Pearl Harbor without considering Japanese-German-Italian collaboration, as well as the phases dealing with preparations for war and relations with the United States and the British Commonwealth of Nations. With this in mind, I am sending, under separate cover, at this time my general opening statement made at the beginning of the case, and factual statements mad3e at the beginning of the introduction of evidence relating to the three phases just mentioned. I have directed that key documents supporting these factual statements be sent you from time to time.