assumed that they possess power to draw an adverse inference from the failure or refusal of a party to produce such evidence, “; the use of presumptions (Brewer, Moller and Co. case, Ralston, Venezuelan Arbitrations of 1903, 584, presumption of “regularity and validity of all acts of public officials”; Frierdich and Co., ibid., pp. 31, 42, regularity of official acts; Black and Stratton case, Moore, International Arbitrations, p. 3138; and generally, Ralston, Law and Procedure of International Tribunals, pp. 223-224, and Sandifer, op, cit., p. 198); the doctrine of judicial notice (Island of Palmas, Scott, Hague Court Reports, 2nd, p. 92, at 96, holding the text of the Treaty of Utrecht to be “of public notoriety”; and generally, Sandifer, op. cet., p. 100, for exceptions to the doctrine. Witenberg, op.cit./ p. 31, points out that he law of a particular state must be proved as any other fact. The practice of the Permanent Court of International Justice supports this view: Anzilotti, J., in the Danzig Decrees, Judgments of the Permanent Court, Series A. No. 21, p. 124; Hudson J., in the Societe Commerciale case, ibid, Series A/B, No. 78, p. 184, and idem., the Permanent Court of International Justice, p. 623); and rules relating to the burden of proof (I Wigmore, Evidence, p. 152; Sandifer, op. cit. pp. 91-92, 97; but compare Feller, The Mexican Claims Commissions, p. 261, note 22). A diluted war variation of the “best evidence” rule is applied by international tribunals to the weight of evidence presented rather than to tits admissibility. Says Sandifer: “Secondary evidence will not necessarily be excluded because better evidence is hold to be available, but less weight, or in some cases no weight at all, may be attached to it. The rule is generally broadly stated as a requirement that the best available evidence be produced, without reducing it to specific technical requirements as to particular types of evidence *** The liberality of tribunals in the admission of evidence has no doubt been a contributing factor to their frequent insistence on the production of the best evidence of which the circumstances of the case permit.” 6. Not infrequently the justification for admitting materials which would not constitute evidence by familiar standards is found in the express terms of the protocol of compromise. Thus in the Venezuelan Arbitrations of 1903, it was provided that the claims should be decided upon such evidence or information only as should be furnished by or on behalf of the respective governments, and that the Commissions should consider all written documents or statements on behalf of the respective governments (Ralston, 4